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The standard competitive model of the labor market supposes that wages are equal to
marginal products and the wage structure is determined by the equilibrium of supply and
demand. That simple model forms the backbone of most studies of the evolution of wage
inequality. For example, Katz and Murphy (1992) argue that the return to education in-
creased in the 1980s because the rate of increase in the relative supply of more-educated
labor decelerated, while relative demand steadily increased. Similarly, Juhn, Murphy, and
Pierce (1993) argue that the growth in within-group wage inequality throughout the 1970s
and 1980s was driven by an increase in the demand for unobserved skills. A main virtue
of such studies that deploy a standard competitive model of the labor market is that they
generally provide a straightforward interpretation of the evolution of the wage structure in
familiar terms of the supply and demand for di￿erent types of labor.
Despite the appeal of the standard competitive model, however, in reality ￿rms appear
to ￿nd the problem of setting wages equal to marginal products di￿cult if not daunting.
Stephen Kerr (1975), in a paper that has earned a place in the canonical MBA course on
organization, provides a number of examples of ￿rms that, in his opinion, completely fail in
their attempt to encourage and pay people according to their marginal production. 1 The
U.S. federal government, in an e￿ort to improve the operation and wage structure of the
federal civil service, commissioned the National Research Council to produce the study Pay
for Performance in 1991.2 The study found that in 1978 the federal government had 6000
pages of civil service law, procedure, and regulation in place, governing more than 30 pay
systems, and a key recommendation of the study was the need to simplify and improve such
complex operations. Returning to the private sector, Baker, Jensen, and Murphy (1988)
lament the fact that ￿rms seem to be using pay systems that are di￿cult to explain using
standard economic models. They conclude that practitioners in the ￿eld of compensation
may be sacri￿cing organizational e￿ciency in favor of pay equity.
Such evidence suggests that measuring and rewarding individual performance is di￿cult
and costly. If so, e￿orts to bolster the e￿ectiveness of payment systems, as with any other
technology, should improve over time. The contribution of this paper is threefold. We ￿rst
show, using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), that the incidence of
1See Robert Gibbons (1997) page 9.
2See Milkovich and Wigdor (1991).
1performance-pay has increased substantially since the late 1970s. This increase is consistent
with the view that the cost of collecting and processing information has declined over time
with advances in information and communication technologies. Second, we show that wages
are less equally distributed in performance-pay jobs than in other jobs because the return
to productive characteristics like education is larger in performance-pay jobs. Combining
these two sets of ￿ndings, we demonstrate that the growth in performance-pay jobs has
contributed substantially to the rise in wage inequality in the United States between the late
1970s and the early 1990s. We also ￿nd that evidence from a brief analysis of the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) supports our results using the PSID.
The paper also is an interesting complement to studies on labor market institutions
that tend to focus on a very di￿erent segment of the work force￿unionized labor. We show
that workers paid for performance are relatively unlikely to belong to unions or to be paid
around the minimum wage. Just as a fall in unionization and the real value of the minimum
wage may have made wages in the middle and low end of the wage distribution closer to
marginal products, it appears that the growing incidence of performance-pay produces a
similar outcome for workers on the high end of the wage distribution. This is particularly
important because changes in inequality are increasingly concentrated at the top levels of
the wage distribution (see, for example, Piketty and Saez (2003), Autor, Katz, and Kearney
(2006) and Lemieux (2006)).
Our empirical strategy builds upon two of the most prevalent solutions to how best to set
employee pay. The ￿rst of these, epitomized by the system recommended by Hay Associates,
begins with an evaluation of the needs of a job, and then ￿xes compensation equal to ￿job
value￿.3 Under such a system, compensation is e￿ectively ￿xed before the worker is hired.
This implies that compensation is mainly determined by characteristics of the job, with
the relationship between worker ability and compensation driven by selection￿￿rms hire the
most able person that applies for the job. A common alternative compensation system,
recommended by compensation consultants such as Ed Lawler, is ￿pay for the person￿. That
system entails rewarding a person’s productivity rather than the job. Under such a regime,
the base pay re￿ects job value, with additional compensation paid after employment to
reward the worker for realized performance. 4
Although we cannot observe all the details of the type of compensation system used
3See chapter 4 of Milkovich and Newman (1996) for a detailed description of this approach.
4See Section III of Milkovich and Newman (1996).
2by ￿rms in the PSID, we can observe whether an employee has been paid some form of
performance-pay in a given period. Our identi￿cation strategy is therefore built on the
hypothesis that performance pay is an imperfect signal of ￿pay for the person￿. One cannot
a priori exclude the possibility that ￿rms that base compensation upon ￿job value￿ do not
provide some perfunctory bonus pay. Yet we suppose that ￿rms that use ￿pay for the person￿
should have a greater fraction of the variance in wages explained by factors speci￿c to the
worker, while the variance in jobs without performance-pay should be more related to factors
speci￿c to that job.
In addition, using the panel structure of the data set, we can follow workers who switch
between performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs. This allows us another way to
distinguish between the job- and person-speci￿c determinants of wages, including the rela-
tive contributions of the individual and match-speci￿c components of variance. Consistent
with our hypothesis, we ￿nd that pay is relatively more sensitive to job characteristics, as
opposed to worker characteristics, in non-performance-pay jobs, while the reverse is true in
performance-pay jobs. Moreover, we ￿nd strong evidence that the contribution of the job-
match speci￿c component of variance is very modest in performance-pay jobs relative to the
worker-speci￿c component of variance. In contrast, we ￿nd that the job-match component
accounts for a much larger share of the variance in performance-pay than non-performance
pay jobs, which is consistent with our ￿nding on the e￿ect of observed job characteristics.
Those results are consistent with the notion that compensation in performance-pay jobs is
more closely tied to worker productivity than it is in non-performance-pay jobs.
Next, we consider the implication of these results for changes in wage inequality. If the
incidence of performance-pay is increasing over time, this implies that the importance of
person-speci￿c e￿ects is also increasing with time, which in turn can lead to an increase in
inequality. We shed light on this issue by linking the increase in inequality from the late
1970s to the early 1990s to the increase in the incidence of performance-pay. We ￿rst show
that wage inequality is generally greater in performance-pay jobs than in other jobs, and
that inequality has risen faster in performance-pay jobs than in other jobs during the 1980s.
Putting together those observations, and the fact that the incidence of performance has
increased over the same time period, we ￿nd that about a quarter of the increase in the
variance of wages between the late 1970s and early 1990s is associated with the increased use
of performance-pay. Even more striking, we can explain nearly all of the increase in wage
3inequality above the 80th percentile.
These results show that the technology of compensation, including payment schemes and
e￿ective measurement systems, is an important ingredient for a complete understanding of
how compensation varies over time and across jobs. The more di￿cult premise is to establish
a causal relationship between advances in the technology of compensation and increased
inequality. Here the evidence is more indirect. In the next section, we review the literature
on compensation, and empirical work that illustrates that the form of compensation does
a￿ect the e￿ciency of the employment relationship. From this literature one can conclude
that not only does compensation matter, but that ￿rms are likely constrained in their ability
to o￿er the most e￿cient contract. Hence part of the increased incidence in the use of
performance-pay must arise from enhancements in the technology of compensation.
In Section 3, we present our formal measurement model, in which performance-pay is
viewed as a indicator that ￿rms pay wages that are closer to the marginal product of workers
than ￿rms that do not use performance-pay. We also derive a number of testable implications
from the simple model. In Section 4, we present the data used for the empirical analysis
and illustrate the growth in the incidence of performance-pay over time. Section 5 presents
estimates from the PSID of the e￿ect of performance-pay on the wage structure, supple-
mented with some corroborating evidence from the NLSY. We argue that this evidence is
consistent with the view that wages on performance-pay jobs are closer to marginal products
than wages on other jobs. We then show in Section 6 how the growth in performance-pay
has contributed to the growth in wage inequality between the late 1970s and the early 1990s.
After presenting robustness checks in section 7, we conclude with a discussion of the results
in Section 8.
2 Pay-for-performance
Frederick Taylor (1911) was likely the ￿rst, in his work on scienti￿c management, to formally
observe that there are gains from monitoring workers to enhance performance. He also notes
that such systems are potentially what would come to be called Pareto-improving, because
the more productive workers will be paid higher wages, while ￿rm pro￿ts will increase. He
also recognized the importance of getting workers to closely associate material rewards with
4their improvements in output.5 It is surprising that although these principles were clearly
laid out in 1911, as the work of Steven Kerr (1975) illustrates, many ￿rms continue to use
dysfunctional compensation systems.
The recent economics literature explores a number of reasons why ￿rms may not be able
to implement e￿cient pay-for-performance systems. In his seminal work on asymmetric
information, Akerlof (1970) shows that market mechanisms may not work when buyers
cannot observe the quality of a good that is sold. Yet Alchian and Demsetz (1972) build upon
this observation to suggest that ￿rms, through their ability to monitor and reward employees,
can mitigate at least some of the problems that arise due to asymmetric information.
Taylor (1911) also laments the fact that in many situations, workers choose to work at
a pace that is far below their capacity. Gibbons (1987) shows that such behavior is rational
when the ￿rm cannot observe the di￿culty of the job, and uses observed performance to
increase the demands upon the worker without a corresponding increase in compensation
(the so-called ￿ratchet e￿ect￿). Kanemoto and MacLeod (1992) show that if the di￿culty of
the job can be observed, so that variations in performance arise from variations in worker
ability, then performance-pay is not undermined by the ratchet e￿ect in a competitive labor
market. Baker (1992) and Holmstr￿m and Milgrom (1991) further observe that if available
performance measures are not be well-correlated with desired performance, this may lead to
dysfunctional behavior in addition to low output. For example, if a programmer is paid by
the number of lines of computer code generated, then she or he will produce a large number
of lines of code, even though the code may be error-ridden and ine￿cient. Hence, the ability
to introduce an e￿ective pay-for-performance system is in part a technological issue that
depends upon the availability of good measurement systems.
The cost of obtaining such a good performance measure is, in turn, likely to be related
to job characteristics. Brown (1990) explores the choice between a ￿xed salary, merit pay
and piece-rate compensation. Using data from the BLS industry wage survey, he ￿nds that
the choice depends upon the monitoring costs, with ￿rms choosing standard rates when
monitoring costs are high, as in the case of complex jobs. He observes that merit pay is used
when workers feel that their evaluations are fair.
MacLeod and Parent (1999) consider a similar question using a number of panel data sets
5On page 48, Taylor observes ￿a reward if it is to be e￿ective in stimulating men to do their best work,
must come soon after the work is done.￿ He goes on to observe on page 49 the importance of selecting good
workers.
5that allow better controls for worker heterogeneity. In addition, they consider a broader class
of compensation systems, and di￿erentiate between bonus pay, commission contracts, and
piece-rate contracts. They ￿nd that commission contracts are widely used in sales jobs, where
the level of sales provides a clean measure of performance. When performance measures are
more subjective, then ￿rms either use bonus pay or time pay with little explicit pay-for-
performance. In addition, MacLeod and Parent show (theoretically) that ￿rms are more
likely to use straight pay when there are strong complementarities among employees. For
example, in an assembly-line, the pace of the line is ￿xed, and hence all workers must work
at a similar pace. Under a regime with strong complementarities in production, performance
is constrained by the weakest link, and there is little bene￿t from enhancing individual
performance if the performance of the weakest link is not a￿ected. This suggests that for such
jobs compensation is more tightly linked to the job rather than individual characteristics.
This evidence supports the theoretical predictions of Baker (1992) and Holmstr￿m and
Milgrom (1991) that the form of compensation varies with the characteristics of the job that
a￿ect monitoring costs. Hence, the incidence of performance-pay is likely to vary over time
as a function of job composition as well as the relative cost of using such a system. By itself,
this does not imply that an increased use of performance-pay should result in an increase in
wage inequality. If the labor market is frictionless, then selection into jobs should generate
a strong relationship between ability and wages.
However, if the labor market has signi￿cant frictions, and straight time-wages cannot
adjust in the short run, then we might expect an increase in performance-pay to have an
impact upon inequality. There is a signi￿cant body of empirical evidence showing that this
is indeed the case. MacLeod and Parent (1999) ￿nd that bonuses are much more sensitive to
business cycle ￿uctuations than straight wages, a result complementary to the work of Card
and Hyslop (1997) showing that contract wages are rigid.
The literature on inter-industry wage di￿erences, such as Krueger and Summers (1988)
and Gibbons and Katz (1992), ￿nds that part of a worker’s compensation is industry speci￿c.
Shimer (2005) shows that one can explain this evidence with a model that explicitly supposes
no performance-pay and search frictions that make it impossible to achieve e￿cient matching.
Kotliko￿ and Gokhale (1992) provide some additional evidence that performance-pay is
important for wage formation. They measure the wage/productivity pro￿le of workers at
a single ￿rm, and ￿nd that sales persons have income set to their marginal products. In
6contrast, they ￿nd that for management work individuals’ marginal products are not in
general equal to their wages, and attribute that result to the cost of evaluating worker
performance.
Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) provide evidence that wages
are not equal to marginal products because information is imperfect and it takes time for
￿rms to learn about the actual productivity of workers. Lazear (2000) shows that when an
auto-glass ￿rm moved to a piece-rate system, it resulted in more able workers taking these
jobs, illustrating again that performance-pay enhances the productivity of the worker-to-￿rm
match.
Our contribution to this literature is to show that if performance-pay improves the quality
of a worker-￿rm match, then an increased incidence of performance-pay implies greater wage
inequality. We then document the contribution of increased reliance on performance-pay to
the wage inequality in the 1980s and 1990s.
As a whole, the existing evidence shows that when there are good performance measures,
performance-pay can enhance employee productivity and improve match quality. However,
the use of performance-pay is constrained by the quality of available performance measures.
As a consequence, a pro￿t maximizing ￿rm will introduce performance-pay in a particular
job only when the quality of the performance measure is su￿ciently good. This suggests
that the incidence of performance-pay increases with the quality of performance measures
available. This may arise either from changes in the technology of monitoring or from an
increase in the fraction of jobs for which there are good performance measures.
It is di￿cult to distinguish between these e￿ects. However, we do know that there is
a large and thriving industry devoted to the creation of knowledge management systems
and better measuring tools. Consulting companies specializing in compensation, such as
Hay Associates, Hewitt, and Towers Perrin have grown tremendously over the last 30 years.
SAP, a major supplier of software used to monitor employee performance, has experienced
sales growth from DM150 million in 1985 to $8.8 billion today. These trends illustrate the
importance that ￿rms place upon monitoring and measuring employee performance. Without
such measurement, performance-pay is not possible. In the next Section we describe the
empirical implication of such improved performance measures.
73 Measurement Model
The basic idea of the model is very simple. We start with the traditional distinction between
cases of ￿wages attached to jobs￿ versus cases of ￿pay for the person￿. The former case corre-
sponds to the model that Shimer (2005) uses to explain inter-industry wage di￿erentials. In
his model, ￿rms set wages, then workers apply for jobs. Consistent with the ￿Hay system￿,
this implies that compensation for a particular job is determined by the characteristics of
the job, which in turn determines a constituency of applicants. The ￿rm then hires the most
able individual from the applicant pool. Since ￿rms must make their hiring decision before
employment, this implies that compensation is less sensitive to the ex post, realized produc-
tivity of the worker. In contrast, a performance-pay system begins with a base pay that
re￿ects the ex ante productivity of the worker and is then adjusted ex post with additional
pay that re￿ects the worker’s realized productivity.
Thus, with ￿wages are attached to jobs￿, all workers working on the same job for the
same ￿rm are paid the same way. For example, each job classi￿cation may correspond
to a speci￿c wage grid that depends on seniority within the ￿rm. A prime example of
jobs that frequently set pay through such a method are union jobs where the ￿rm and the
union collectively bargain to establish a wage grid. Even outside the union sector, however,
compensation consultants such as Hay have developed systems to measure the skills needed
for a job, which in turn implies wages that re￿ect the features of the job rather than the
unique abilities of the worker. While some formal models could be used to show why it could
be optimal for ￿rms, in some settings, to pay wages attached to jobs, we do not attempt to
provide such an explanation in this paper. We simply note that, econometrically speaking,
only job characteristics, including seniority, should have an e￿ect on wages when wages are
attached to jobs. This means that conditional on job characteristics, individual productive
characteristics of workers such as education have no e￿ect on their wages. The unconditional
e￿ect of education on earnings will still of course be positive if education helps workers get
more lucrative jobs.
The resulting wage setting equation of worker i working for ￿rm j at time t when wages
are attached to jobs is:
y
J
ijt = zijtϕt + νij + eijt
8where zijt is a set of observed job characteristics like occupation or seniority, νij is a
￿￿rm-speci￿c￿ wage term that captures di￿erences in wage policies across ￿rms, and eijt
is an idiosyncratic pay component. The ￿rm-speci￿c component νij could be linked, for
instance, to the average level of productivity of workers employed by the ￿rm. Even if ￿rms
do not observe individual productivity, ￿rms that turn out to have more productive workers
will be able to pay higher average wages to all workers. Alternatively, νij could capture the
fact that some ￿rms pay better than others because of reasons such as rent-sharing.
Now we may consider the other pole, the ￿pay for the person￿ case where workers are paid
their marginal products, regardless of the job they hold. This corresponds to a traditional
human capital pricing model where workers are simply paid for the marginal product of
their human capital. As in the case of wages attached to jobs, we do not discuss here why
some ￿rms pay wages equal to marginal products while others do not. We simply note
that, starting in the late 1970s, many compensation consultants (e.g. Ed Lawler) began
recommending that ￿rms pay for the worker rather than the job using formal evaluation
of worker performance. One possible reason for these changes is that formal evaluation of
worker performance became easier with advances in information processing technologies.




ijt = xitβt + dtθi + uijt
where xit represents standard observed (by the econometrician) characteristics like po-
tential experience and education, θi represents a worker-speci￿c productivity term, and uijt
is an idiosyncratic productivity term. The parameters βt and dt are the returns (in terms of
productivity) to observed and unobserved characteristics.
As discussed in the introduction, existing measures of performance-pay are only an im-
perfect indicator of whether a ￿rm pays wages attached to jobs, or pays for the person
(competitive wages). For example, some ￿rms may be paying an end-of-year bonus to all
workers whatever their performance. In that case, the fact that bonuses are used does not
mean that wages are equal to marginal products. Other ￿rms may be paying straight wages
that nonetheless end up being very to close to the actual productivity of workers. In such
cases, ￿rms pay wages attached to workers even if we do not formally observe performance-
pay schemes such as bonuses, commissions, or piece-rates. To capture these possibilities, let
9sp and sn be the probability that workers on performance-pay jobs ( p) and non-performance-
pay jobs (n), respectively, are actually paid their marginal product, yW
ijt. For performance-pay
to be an informative measure, it must be that sp > sn, i.e. that workers who are paid for
performance are more likely to be paid on the basis of their marginal product than workers
who are not paid for performance. Conditional on performance-pay, the expected wage of
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The variances of the error terms satisfy:
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A number of interesting predictions follow directly from this model:
1. The return to measurable worker characteristics, xit, is larger in performance-pay jobs









103. The return to unmeasurable person-speci￿c characteristics θi is larger in performance-
pay jobs than non-performance-pay jobs (d
p
t > dn
t ). A related implication is that
for a given distribution of θi, the variance of the person-speci￿c component will be
larger in performance-pay than non-performance-pay jobs. When comparing workers
on performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs, the variance could also be di￿erent
because of di￿erences in the variance of θi among these two groups of workers. We will
adjust for this empirically by comparing the variance of the person-speci￿c component
in performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs for a subsample of ￿switchers￿ who
are observed on both types of jobs.





5. The variance of the idiosyncratic term in performance-pay jobs, var(ε
p
ijt), may either
be larger (if var(uijt) > var(eijt) ) or smaller (if var(uijt) < var(eijt)) than the variance
of the idiosyncratic term in non-performance-pay jobs, var(εn
ijt).
The predictions will be tested in Section 4. Note, however, that it is not clear from these
predictions what will be the e￿ect of performance-pay on wage inequality. Remember that in
our framework an increase in performance pay means that a higher share of workers are paid
their marginal products. Predictions 1 and 3 mean that returns to (observed and unobserved)
skills increase when the fraction of performance-pay jobs increases, which, in turn, results
in more wage inequality. This may be partly o￿set, however, by the fact that inequality
linked to job characteristics (prediction 2) and ￿rm e￿ects (prediction 4) decrease when the
fraction of performance pay jobs decreases. Whether or not performance-pay results in more
wage inequality is thus an empirical question that will be addressed explicitly in Section 5.
4 Data
The bulk of our analysis is conducted using data from the PSID. The main advantage of the
PSID is that it provides a representative sample of the workforce for a relatively long time
period, which is essential for studying the e￿ect of pay-for-performance on wage inequality.
One disadvantage of the PSID, however, is that our constructed measures of performance-pay
are relatively crude and may be fairly imperfect proxies for whether or not workers are paid
11their marginal products. Therefore, to probe the robustness of the results based on the PSID,
we re-estimate some of the key models using the NLSY. The NLSY is an excellent tool to do
so because it asks workers directly whether or not their earnings are based on performance,
bonuses, or commissions. This is arguably a better measure of performance-pay than what
is available in the PSID. Unfortunately, however, the question about performance-pay in the
NLSY was only included in the late 1980s and late 1990s. Combined with the fact that the
NLSY only follows a narrow cohort of individuals over time, it is not possible to use the
NLSY to look at the broad a￿ects of performance-pay on changes in wage inequality or for
insight into a wide variety of worker characteristics.
4.1 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1976-1998)
The PSID sample we use consists of male heads of households aged 18 to 65 with average
hourly earnings between $1.00 and $100.00 (in $79) for the years 1976-1998, where the hourly
wage rate is obtained by dividing total earnings in the previous year by hours of work. 6
Individuals in the public sector, or who are self-employed, are excluded from the analysis.
This leaves us with a total sample of 30,424 observations for 3,181 workers. Summary
statistics are reported in Table 1 and will be discussed below.
4.1.1 Measurement Issues
Identifying performance-pay In the PSID, we construct a performance-pay indicator
variable by looking at whether part of a worker’s total compensation includes a variable pay
component (bonus, commission, piece-rate). For interview years 1976-1992, we are able to
determine whether a worker received a bonus or a commission over the previous calendar
year through the use of multiple questions. First, workers are asked the amount of money
they received from working overtime, commissions, or from bonuses paid by the employer. 7
Second, since we sometimes know only whether or not workers worked overtime, and if they
are working overtime in a given year, not the amount of pay they received for overtime,
6In the PSID, data on hours worked during year t, as well as on total labor earnings,
bonuses/commissions/overtime income, and overtime hours, are asked in interview year t+1. Thus we
actually use data covering interview years 1976-1999.
7Note that the question refers speci￿cally to any amounts earned from bonuses, overtime, or commissions
in addition to wages and salaries earned.
12we classify them as not having had a variable pay component. 8 Third, workers not paid
exclusively by the hour, or not exclusively by a salary, are asked how they are paid: they can
report being paid commissions, piece-rates, etc., as well as a combination of salaried/hour pay
with piece-rates or commissions. 9 Through this combination of questions, we are thus able
to identify all non-overtime workers who received performance-pay in bonus, commission, or
piece-rate form.
Starting with interview year 1993, there are separate questions about the amounts earned
in bonuses, commissions, tips, and overtime for the previous calendar year. Thus there is
no need to back out an estimate of bonuses from an aggregate amount since the question
is asked directly. For the sake of comparability with the pre-1993 years, we nevertheless
classify as receiving no performance-pay all workers who report any overtime work. In this
way we are able to determine whether a worker’s total compensation included a performance-
pay component for each year of the survey. One obvious drawback is that it is likely the
performance-pay component we construct will be noisy. However, due to our treatment of
overtime workers, we conservatively lean on the side of misclassifying workers as receiving
no performance-pay even when they do.
De￿ning performance-pay jobs10 One of the main goals of this paper is to see whether
employment relationships that involve performance are systematically di￿erent from those
in which no such performance-pay is ever received. Thus we de￿ne performance-pay jobs
as employment relationships in which part of the worker’s total compensation includes a
variable pay component (bonus, a commission, piece-rate) at least once during the course of
the relationship. In some sense, we are interested in the di￿erences between types of jobs
8We do not count these workers as pay for performance because in some years overtime hours are reported,
while in other years we only know whether they worked overtime or not.
9In many survey years workers are not asked if their compensation package involves a mixture of
salary/hourly pay and a variable component. All they are asked is how they are paid if not by the hour or a
salary. Although there is no way to directly verify it, this likely results in understating the incidence of any
form of variable pay because workers are not allowed to answer that they are paid, say, a salary, and then
report a commission: they have to choose. Our assertion that it likely understates the extent of variable
pay is motivated in part by the fact that workers in the NLSY, to be described below, are not restricted in
describing the way they are paid, and workers in the NLSY are more likely to report having part of their
compensation package contain a performance-pay component.
10To avoid confusion, note that we use ￿jobs,￿ ￿employment relationship￿, and ￿job match￿ interchangeably.
Although in most of the survey years spanning the sample period, the PSID does have information on tenure
in the position, we do not use it. As is well known, simply determining employer tenure in the PSID can be
problematic (see Brown and Light (1992)).
13as much as we are in the nature of particular performance-pay employment relationships. 11
Two related measurement issues arise. The ￿rst is a simple measurement error concern. On
the one hand, we are likely to misclassify performance-pay jobs as non-performance-pay jobs
(false negative) if some employment relationships are terminated before performance-pay
is received. This would be particularly problematic if the ￿rst receipt of performance-pay,
which identi￿es the job as a performance-pay job, tends to occur later instead of sooner
in the course of the employment relationship. On the other hand, some of the jobs are
wrongly classi￿ed as performance-pay jobs (false positive) for reasons discussed earlier (e.g.
end-of-year bonus). While it is a priori di￿cult to assess which of the false negative or false
positive problems are more important, their consequence is the same: assuming there is a
genuine di￿erence between the two types of jobs, misclassi￿cation will tend to attenuate
such di￿erences. Our measurement model explicitly deals with this issue by introducing the
probabilities sp and sn. A ￿false negative￿ means that sp < 1, while a ￿false positive￿ means
that sn > 0.
A second related issue is an ￿end-point￿ problem: given our de￿nition of performance-pay
jobs, we may mechanically understate the fraction of workers in such jobs at the start of
our sample period because most employment relationships started before 1976. Similarly,
jobs that started toward the end of the sample period may be performance-pay jobs but
are classi￿ed otherwise because they have not lasted long enough for performance-pay to
be observed. The basic measurement problem is that, conditional on job duration, we tend
to observe a given job match fewer times at the two ends of our sample period than in the
middle of the sample. Consider, for example, the case of a job that lasts for ￿ve years. For
jobs that last from 1985 to 1989, all ￿ve observations on this job match are captured in our
PSID sample. For jobs that last from 1973 to 1977, however, only two of the ￿ve years of
the job match are captured in our PSID sample, which mechanically reduces the probability
of classifying the job as one with performance-pay.
Because of this end-point problem, we get an unbalanced distribution of the number of
observed job match observations at di￿erent points of the sample period. One simple solution
to the problem is to ￿rebalance￿ the sample using regression or other methods. Therefore we
create a variable that counts the number of job matches observed for each job (as opposed to
the actual job duration), and then add this variable as an additional control in the regression
11That said, we also look at the impact within a job of an alternative de￿nition of a performance-pay.
More on that below.
14models. Similarly, the corrected incidence of performance-pay over time can be computed
by running a linear probability model (or a logit) in which year dummies and the number of
times the job-match is observed are included as regressors. The year dummies then capture
the corrected incidence of pay-for-performance job. All the graphs of the incidence of pay-
for-performance, as well as all the regression results reported below, are adjusted using this
procedure.12
Descriptive statistics Table 1 compares the sample characteristics of workers on performance-
pay and non-performance-pay jobs, respectively. First, notice that 37 percent of the 30,424
observations are in performance-pay jobs, though these raw ￿gures must be interpreted with
caution because of the end-point problem discussed earlier. Workers on performance-pay jobs
tend to earn more and have higher levels of education than workers on non-performance-
pay jobs. Note that the hourly wage rate includes both regular wage and salary earnings
and performance-pay in the case of workers on performance-pay jobs. Annual hours worked
and employer tenure also tend to be higher for workers on performance-pay than for non-
performance-pay jobs. In section 7 we show that these results are not sensitive to an alter-
native adjustment for the end point issue.
Not surprisingly, the unionization rate (percent covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ments) is much lower among performance-pay workers, suggesting that, as expected, pay
structure in union ￿rms tend to have wages attached to jobs instead of workers. Another
important di￿erence is that there is a much higher fraction of workers paid by the hour in
non-performance than performance-pay jobs. On the ￿ip side, workers on performance-pay
jobs are much more likely to be salaried workers than those on non-performance-pay jobs.
This is an important point, since the growth in wage inequality has been stronger among
salaried than hourly workers (Lemieux (2006)). Performance-pay is thus more likely to a￿ect
the very group of workers who have experienced the largest increase in inequality, and who
are also least likely to be a￿ected by other institutional factors such as the minimum wage
or unionization.
The cross tabulations shown in Table 2 con￿rm that performance-pay is more prevalent
in high-wage occupations like professional, managerial, and sales positions than in others.
12Note that the PSID became a bi-annual survey after 1996. This poses a problem in aligning job in-
formation (tenure, industry, etc.) that relates to the job held at the interview to the earnings information,
including bonus amounts, which are for the calendar year before the interview.
15For example, the fraction of workers on performance-pay jobs ranges from only 22 percent
for service workers, to 74 percent for sales workers. By contrast, performance-pay is more
evenly used across industries, ranging from for a low of 29 percent in construction to a high
of 61 percent in ￿nance, insurance and real estate (FIRE).
Figure 1 provides additional descriptive information on the distribution of wages for
performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs by reporting kernel density estimates of the
distribution of hourly wages. The ￿gure shows that hourly wages have a higher mean and
median, and are less evenly distributed in performance-pay than non-performance-pay jobs.
We next turn to the time trends in the prevalence of performance-pay. Figures 2a to
2e show the evolution of the fraction of performance-pay jobs for various subgroups of the
workforce. In all cases, we correct for the end-point problem by estimating a linear prob-
ability model in which we include year dummies and control for the number of times each
job-match is observed. The incidence of pay-for-performance jobs reported in the ￿gures
is then the predicted probabilities implied by the estimates’ year e￿ects, holding the num-
ber of observed job matches at a ￿xed value (close to the mean for the relevant sample
analyzed). In all ￿gures, we also report the raw incidence of performance-pay obtained by
computing the fraction of workers who report some performance-pay in a given year. As
argued above, this strongly understates the incidence of performance-pay jobs since workers
on performance-pay jobs will not necessarily receive a performance payment (like a bonus)
in each year on the job. One advantage of this simple measure, however, is that it is not
a￿ected by the end-point problem and provides additional evidence of the robustness of the
underlying trends in performance-pay.
Figure 2a shows that the overall incidence of performance-pay jobs has increased from
a little more than 30 percent in the late 1970s to more than 40 percent in the 1990s. The
incidence is computed holding the number of times a job-match is observed at 5, which is
close to the average value in the sample. The simpler measure based on the fraction of
workers reporting performance-pay in a given year also clearly increases over time, especially
in the 1980s. Figure 2a also shows the fraction of workers covered by a collective bargaining
agreement. Remarkably, the line showing the fraction of unionized workers is almost the
mirror image of the performance-pay job incidence line.
As mentioned earlier, the decline in unionization has been found to be an important
contributor to increased wage inequality in the United States. On the surface it would
16appear that one simple mechanism by which de-unionization would have increased wage
dispersion is by allowing ￿rms to o￿er more variable pay, possibly in the form of bonuses.
However, as we can see in Figures 2b and 2c, a particularly informative way of looking at
the increase in the incidence of performance-pay jobs is to break it down by how workers are
paid. The incidence of performance-pay jobs increased for workers paid by the hour while
unionization decreased sharply (Figure 2b). The bulk of the increase in performance-pay
in Figure 2a is driven by salaried workers who are not likely to be unionized at any time
(Figure 2c). The increase in the incidence of performance-pay jobs among salaried workers
illustrated in Figure 2c is quite remarkable. It increases from about 30 percent in the late
1970s, to nearly 50 percent by the end of the sample period.
A strong case for a simple de-unionization explanation would have been found if, for
example, the fraction of performance-pay jobs was constant over time in both the union
and non-union sectors. Under this scenario, the growth in performance-pay would have
been a simple composition e￿ect linked to the decline in unionization. Figures 2d and 2e
show, however, that the incidence of performance-pay jobs increased among both union and
non-union workers, although the increase was somewhat steadier among non-union workers.
Next, in Figure 3, we show the distribution of the share of performance-pay in total labor
earnings. To compute the share we use the amounts directly reported by respondents over
the 1993-1999 period for the amounts earned in commission, bonuses, and tips earned in
the previous calendar year.13 Given that the median share is about 3.5% of total earnings,
it is clear that performance-pay, per se, only represents a relatively modest component of
total compensation. We thus interpret the presence of performance-pay as only an indicator
that wages (both the straight wage and the performance-pay component) are paid more
competitively in performance-pay than non-performance-pay jobs.
4.2 Performance-pay in the NLSY and other data sources
As mentioned earlier, we also provide supporting evidence from the NLSY that asks more
explicitly about pay-for-performance in the 1988, 1989, 1990, 1996, 1998 and 2000 waves of
13Note that it is also possible to back out an estimate of bonus amounts earned in pre-1993 data by using
the set of questions on amounts earned in overtime, bonuses, or commissions and the questions on overtime
work and pay method. Turning to ￿missing￿ all observations in which respondents either worked overtime or
report commissions earnings, we get an estimate of bonuses earned. The resulting distribution of the share
of bonuses earned is very similar to the one shown in Figure 3.
17the panel. To simplify the analysis, we pool the 1988-1990 observations into a ￿late 1980s￿
period, and the 1996-2000 observations into a ￿late 1990s￿ period. As in the case of the PSID,
we focus only on males. We also impose a couple of additional sample restrictions similar to
those used by Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and Parent (2005). As in the case of the PSID, we
classify a job as a performance-pay job when the worker reports performance-pay at least
once on that job. Note, however, that the limited number of years in which performance-pay
is measured means that we are less likely to ￿catch￿ performance-pay jobs. We nonetheless
￿nd that the incidence of performance pay jobs increases from 26.1 percent in the late 1980s
to 30 percent in the late 1990s, broadly consistent with the evidence from the PSID.
As an additional check of the robustness of trends in performance-pay, we also looked
at another source of information based on a survey of Fortune 1000 corporations conducted
between 1987 and 2003 (see Lawler III (2003)). The surveys asks ￿rms about the fraction
of their workers with some forms of performance-pay and reports results in categories such
as 0 to 9 percent, 10 to 19 percent, etc. We compute the implied fraction of workers with
performance-pay using the mid-points of these intervals. The implied fractions are 20.7 in
1987, 27.1 in 1990, 34.7 in 1996, and 44.5 in 2002. Once again, these trends con￿rm the
growth in performance-pay measured (imperfectly) in the PSID data.
5 The wage structure in performance-pay and non-performance-
pay jobs
The model of Section 3 provides a number of testable implications about how the structure
of wages should di￿er in performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs. In this section,
we present the main estimation results and discuss how they relate to the predictions of the
model of Section 3.
Table 3 reports a number of simple regression estimates of the e￿ect of performance-
pay on wages (full compensation, including the pay for performance-payments). Note that
there is no particular reason to expect that pay-for-performance jobs pay more (or less) than
non-performance-pay jobs. The main predictions outlined in Section 3 have to do, rather,
with di￿erences in the returns to measured and unmeasured characteristics in the two pay
regimes.
The ￿rst column of Table 3 reports the results of a simple OLS regression of the log hourly
18wage on a dummy for performance-pay jobs. The regressions reported in Table 3 also control
for education, experience, seniority, the number of times the job match is observed, occupa-
tion, and industry. The estimated e￿ect is positive (7.21 percent) and statistically signi￿cant.
The second column shows that the e￿ect of having a pay-for-performance job declines by
half when a dummy for performance-pay received during the year is included. When worker-
speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects are introduced in columns 3 and 4, the e￿ect of performance-pay jobs
becomes essentially zero and insigni￿cant, while the e￿ect of receiving pay-for-performance
in a given year remains positive and signi￿cant.
These results suggest two interesting observations. First, including standard controls for
observed and unobserved workers characteristics (column 4) explains the whole di￿erence in
raw wages between performance pay and non-performance-pay jobs documented in Table 1.
This is a useful result since there is no reason, a priori, to expect that performance-pay jobs
should pay more after adjusting for di￿erences in workers’ characteristics. This suggests that
the relevant heterogeneity is captured by the covariates and the worker-speci￿c ￿xed e￿ect.
A second useful observation is that the estimated e￿ect of pay-for-performance-payment in
a given year is around 5-6 percent in column 4 and in column 5 where we further control for
worker-job ￿xed e￿ects (the e￿ects of performance-pay jobs are no longer identi￿ed in this
speci￿cation). This is quite similar to the average magnitude of performance-pay income
reported in Figure 3, and suggests that performance-pay is not merely displacing base pay,
but results in a increased compensation even after controlling for individual and job-speci￿c
characteristics.
Table 4 provides a ￿rst direct test of some of the implications of the model of Section
2. Columns 1 and 2 report separate estimates of a standard wage equation for performance-
pay and non-performance-pay jobs, respectively. Once again, the estimated models include
both standard human capital characteristics like education and experience (the variables xit
in Section 3), and job characteristics such as seniority as well as industry and occupation
dummies (the variables zijt in Section 3). As expected, the return to education and potential
experience is larger in performance pay than non-performance-pay jobs. The return to
education is 40 percent larger in performance-pay than non-performance-pay jobs (0.093 vs.
0.066) while the return to experience is 60 percent larger (0.0093 vs. 0.0058). The same
pattern of results can be observed in Figure 4, which shows in more detail the relationship
between wages and education in performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs. The results
19also remain relatively unchanged when a person-speci￿c ￿xed e￿ect is introduced in columns
3 and 4. For instance, the coe￿cient on education is 0.018 larger in performance-pay jobs
than in other jobs (compared to a 0.027 di￿erence in OLS models). Note that we estimate
a pooled model with interactions because education is almost time-invariant (for a given
person) in our PSID sample. This means that we cannot separately identify the e￿ect of
education from the ￿xed e￿ect when running separate models for performance-pay and non-
performance pay jobs. The interaction term between performance-pay and education is still
identi￿ed, however, because of the ￿switchers￿ who are observed in both performance-pay
and non-performance-pay jobs. The results for education mean, for example, that more-
educated workers get a bigger wage gain from switching from a non-performance-pay to a
performance-pay job than less-educated workers. Overall, the results support the implication
of the model that returns to observed qualities such as education are higher in performance-
pay than non-performance-pay jobs.
In contrast to that general principle, the e￿ect of seniority is lower in performance-pay
than non-performance-pay jobs. This is consistent with the view that seniority is a job
characteristic that matters when wages are attached to jobs, but not when wages are paid
for the person. The di￿erence remains signi￿cant (and quantitatively larger) when worker
￿xed e￿ects are added in columns 3 and 4. The other key set of job characteristics we
focus on are occupation dummies. Table 5 shows both OLS and ￿xed e￿ect estimates of the
(one-digit) occupation e￿ects for performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs (the other
variables shown in Table 4 are included in these regressions but not reported in the table).
As in Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux, and Parent (2005), including worker-speci￿c ￿xed e￿ects
dramatically reduces the magnitude of the occupation e￿ects, especially for performance-pay
jobs. While the standard deviation of the occupation e￿ects is larger in performance-pay
jobs (0.180) than in other jobs (0.167) when using OLS, it is smaller in performance-pay jobs
(0.056) than in non-performance-pay jobs (0.060) after controlling for ￿xed e￿ects. This is,
once again, consistent with the predictions of Section 3.
Table 6 explores the other predictions of the model about how the variance of the di￿erent
components of the error term compare for performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs. 14
The most interesting comparison is column 2 vs. column 4 of Panel B. Only ￿switchers￿ who
are observed on both performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs are used in Panel B.
14See Parent (1999) for a related analysis with the NLSY comparing piece-rate/commission workers and
those receiving bonuses to salaried and hourly paid workers.
20This means that the underlying variance of the person-speci￿c component θi is the same
for the performance-pay and non-performance-pay samples. As a result, the relative return
to this component in performance-pay and non-performance pay jobs, d
p
t/dn
t , is equal to
the square root of the ratio of the estimated variance of θi in performance-pay and non-




t is equal to 1.47. In other words, d
p
t is 47 percent larger than dn
t .
This is very interesting, since we found in Table 4 that the return to education and
experience in performance-pay jobs also exceeded the return on non-performance-pay jobs
by factor in the 40-60 percent range. Strictly speaking, the model implies that all these
returns should be proportional with a factor a proportionality given by sp/sn. This simple
model thus appears to be a parsimonious way of modeling the wage structure in performance-
pay and non-performance pay jobs.
Also consistent with the theoretical predictions, the results indicate that the variance
of the job-speci￿c term is much smaller in performance-pay (0.006) than non-performance-
pay jobs (0.033). In intuitive terms, this suggests that the ￿rm an individual works for
explains quite a bit of the wage variation in non-performance-pay jobs, but much less in
performance-pay jobs. This provides evidence that pay-for-performance is indeed a good
proxy for whether wages are attached to workers instead of jobs. Finally, the variance
of the ￿residual￿ or idiosyncratic term is slightly smaller in performance-pay than in non-
performance-pay jobs. Remember, however, that the model did not have speci￿c predictions
about whether this variance should be larger for one type of job than for the other.
We also present some complementary evidence from the NLSY in Table 7. As in the case
of the PSID, we run separate wage regressions for performance-pay and non-performance-
pay jobs. We also exploit the fact that the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) score,
which is available in the NLSY, can be used as a proxy for unobserved productive charac-
teristics. Since the AFQT score is purely a measure of worker characteristics, as opposed
to job characteristics, its e￿ect on wages should be larger in performance-pay than in non-
performance-pay jobs. Table 7 con￿rms that both in the late 1980s and late 1990s, returns
to productive worker characteristics (education, experience, and the AFQT score) are larger
in performance-pay than non-performance-pay jobs.
In summary, our analysis of the PSID data supports the view that wages on performance-
pay jobs are more closely linked to productive characteristics than wages on non-performance-
21pay jobs. Relative to performance-pay jobs, wages on these other jobs depend more on
the characteristics of the jobs people hold than on the productive characteristics of the
individuals. The fact that the results from the NLSY, where we use a di￿erent measure of
pay for performance, are similar to the main PSID results, highlights the robustness of our
main ￿ndings. The next Section explores the implications of these ￿ndings for the growth
of wage inequality between the late 1970s and the early 1990s.
6 Performance-pay and the growth in wage inequality
In this Section, we ￿rst perform a variance decomposition that is very similar to what has
been done to quantify the contribution of de-unionization to the growth in wage inequality.
We then look at the impact of performance-pay on broader measures of wages inequality,
such as the 90-50 and the 50-10 gap. As in the case of unions, we decompose the e￿ect of
performance-pay into a between- and within-group component. The between-group compo-
nent, or ￿wage gap￿ e￿ect, re￿ects the fact that a positive wage gap between performance-
pay and non-performance-pay jobs tends to increase inequality. The within-group (groups
being performance-pay and non-performance-pay jobs) component can be divided in two
subterms. First, higher returns to measurable characteristics (education and experience)
in performance-pay jobs create more wage dispersion within the performance-pay sector.
Similarly, di￿erences in the variance of the error term can also contribute to the e￿ect of
performance-pay on overall inequality. This latter term could be further split up into the
three error components discussed above (person-speci￿c, ￿rm-speci￿c, and the idiosyncratic
or residual term). Finally, we use the procedure of DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996)
to adjust for di￿erences in the distribution of observed characteristics when computing the
various counterfactuals. See Dinardo and Lemieux (1997) for a very similar ￿reweighting￿
decomposition applied to unionization.
Before presenting the decomposition results, we ￿rst report some descriptive information
on the trends in wage inequality to be explained. Figure 5 summarizes the changes in wage
inequality in our PSID data by showing the evolution of the standard deviation of wages in
performance-pay, non-performance-pay, and all jobs between 1977 and 1996. As expected,
the ￿gure indicates a substantial increase in inequality over time. For example, Panel A of
Figure 5 shows that the standard deviation of hourly wages for all jobs increased from about
220.52 in 1977 to over 0.60 in the early 1990s, before going down a bit in the 1990s. More
interestingly, the standard deviation for performance-pay jobs increased generally faster than
in non-performance-pay jobs. This pattern is even clearer in Panel B, which focuses only on
full-time/full-year workers. Along with Figure 2a, these results suggest that performance-
pay jobs are closely linked to the growth of wage inequality since 1) inequality grew faster
in performance-pay jobs, and 2) the growing incidence of performance-pay jobs means that
an increasingly large fraction of workers are employed in this more unequal sector.
The decomposition results are reported in Table 8. Although we performed the de-
composition for all workers, wages are weighted by the number of hours of work to get a
distribution of wages that is representative over all the hours worked in the economy, as in
DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996). As indicated at the bottom of the table, the variance
grew by 0.1072 over the period considered (1976-79 to 1990-93). The question is, how much
of this can be attributed to the rising incidence in performance-pay jobs from 30.5 percent
(column 2) to 45.8 percent (column 5)? In terms of the three components discussed above,
the between or wage gap component (row 7) increased from 0.0038 in the 1976-79 to 0.0126
in 1990-93. The within-group component associated to observables increased from 0.0091 to
0.0285 (row 3). Finally, the e￿ect related to the variance of the error term (row 6) decreased
from 0.0049 to 0.0027, o￿setting in part the two other factors. We show at the bottom of the
table that the three terms combined together explain 0.0259, or 24 percent, of the overall
increase in the variance.
Note that the contribution of performance-pay to the growth in wage inequality does
not solely re￿ect the fact that a higher fraction of the work force is now paid under a
compensation system (performance-pay) that generates more inequality. Table 8 also shows
that the inequality-enhancing e￿ect of performance-pay has increased over the course of time.
For instance, row 1 shows that the e￿ect of switching the returns to observables from those in
non-performance-pay jobs to those of performance-pay jobs increases the variance by 0.0299
in 1976-79. By 1990-93, the e￿ect more than doubles to 0.0622. This is consistent with
the evidence in Figure 5 that also shows a larger increase in inequality in performance-pay
than non-performance pay jobs. A possible explanation for this ￿nding is that underlying
changes in the relative demand for skilled workers, such as skill-biased technical change, are
directly translated into inequality growth in the pay for performance sector, while wages are
less responsive to these changes in more traditional compensation systems where wages are
23attached to jobs.
One drawback of the variance as a measure of inequality is that it summarizes the overall
wage dispersion without indicating in which part of the distribution performance-pay has the
largest e￿ect. As mentioned earlier, we expect performance-pay to play a more important
role in the top end than in the low end of the wage distribution￿exactly the place where there
has been the largest expansion in wage inequality (Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006)). One
advantage of the reweighting procedure used in Table 8 is that any measure of dispersion,
such as the 90-50 or the 50-10 gap, can be computed in both the actual and reweighted
sample. The overall e￿ect of performance-pay jobs (which combines both the between-
and within-group e￿ects discussed above) is obtained by simply contrasting the actual and
counterfactual measure of wage dispersion.
Figure 6 shows the di￿erence between the actual and counterfactual wages distribution
at each wage percentile. The striking feature of the ￿gure is that the e￿ect of performance-
pay jobs is concentrated at the top end of the wage distribution. It is also clear that the
e￿ect becomes larger in the early 1990s than in the late 1970s. Figure 7 then compares
the growth in wage inequality that would have prevailed with and without performance-pay
jobs, by showing the change in real wages at each percentile in the actual (with performance-
pay jobs) and counterfactual wage distribution (without performance-pay jobs). The ￿gure
shows that essentially all the growth in wage inequality above the 80th percentile is due
to performance-pay jobs. This is also con￿rmed in Table 9, which shows the impact of
performance-pay jobs on a number or inter-quantile gaps such as the 90-50 gap and the
99-90 gap.
7 Robustness Check
As noted above, given our de￿nition of performance-pay jobs, we mechanically understate
the fraction of workers in such jobs at the start and the end of our sample period. To correct
for this truncation problem, we simply condition in all our estimations on the number of
times a job-match is observed. To see whether our results are sensitive to the procedure
used to correct for the end-point problem, we re-estimated the same models using a di￿erent
sample made of ￿complete￿ job matches. By complete, we mean that the number of times a
job match is observed closely corresponds to the maximum tenure attained by the worker in
24the match. More precisely, we keep all job matches for which the maximum tenure level is
within one integer of the number of times the job match appears in the sample. Given that
some jobs start with tenure close to zero, we would lose those employment relationships if
we kept only the job matches for which the maximum tenure attained was strictly equal to
the number of times the match is observed. 15
Applying this sample selection, we end up with a sample of 17,540 observations. Appendix
Table A1 reports that for this alternative sample most of the main results were the same as
those from our base sample. As can be seen, the only results that di￿er somewhat relate to
the contribution of performance-pay jobs to the increase in inequality between the late 1970s
and the early 1990s and to the error component model. Performance-pay jobs now account
for over 29 percent of inequality growth, while the results for the error component model in
the case of performance-pay jobs show a zero e￿ect for the contribution of the job match
component to the residual variance. There is little reason to believe that our treatment of
truncated job durations drives the results reported in Tables 3 to 9.
8 Conclusion
An increasing proportion of jobs in the U.S. labor market include a performance-pay com-
ponent in addition to regular wages and salaries. In this paper, we look at the e￿ect of
growth of performance-pay on wage inequality. The basic premise is that performance-pay
jobs represent a more accurate measure of employee performance, and hence rewards are
more sensitive to productive characteristics of workers rather than to job characteristics.
We develop a simple model to illustrate this point and derive several testable implications.
Consistent with predictions, we show that compensation in performance-pay jobs is more
closely tied to both observed (by the econometrician) and unobserved productive charac-
teristics of workers. We conclude that the growing incidence of performance-pay accounts
for 24 percent of the growth in the variance of male wages between the late 1970s and the
early 1990s, and for most of the growth in top end wage variance (above the 80th percentile)
during this period.
These results dovetail with the long-standing view in labor economics that labor markets
are not perfectly competitive, and that matching workers to jobs is a costly, time-consuming
15For example, an employment spell observed twice in successive years with starting tenure rounded to
zero and maximum tenure of 1 is kept in the sample, as it clearly represents a complete spell.
25activity. The extent to which wages re￿ect the marginal product of a worker depends upon
the time it takes for the ￿rm to ￿nd the best match. Given that there is chance that an
optimal match is not found, then as Shimer (2005) shows, this can result in persistent inter-
industry wage di￿erences, with the empirical implication that wages are a function of both
job and worker characteristics.
Performance-pay allows compensation to be more closely tailored to individual perfor-
mance with less need for a costly search. This implies that for a given job, there will be
more variation in individual compensation, and hence if there is an increase in the use of
performance pay this should result in an increase in wage inequality. We show evidence
that this indeed happened from the 1970s to the 1990s. We speculate that this may be the
result of improvements in the monitoring and measurement of employee performance. We
also demonstrate that inequality increased faster in performance-pay than non-performance-
pay jobs. This is consistent with wages in performance-pay jobs being more responsive to
underlying changes in underlying productivities of workers due, for instance, to skill-biased
technical change.
These results are not inconsistent with the view that skill-biased technical change can
explain the recent rise of inequality, as discussed by Acemoglu (2002). Yet our results provide
new insights into this process. In particular, pay for individual performance is more e￿ective
when workers performance is both separable from the contribution of other workers and
measurable. The fact that pay-for-performance is associated with an increase the variance
of wages implies that complementarities in production may now be less important than an
individual’s contribution to total output. This suggests that a complete understanding of the
recent increase in wage inequality may require a deeper understanding of technical change
itself. Moreover, the results highlight the point that compensation practices are themselves
a form of technology that adapt to new circumstances, and hence are worthy of future study.
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29Fig 1. Distribution of Log Average Hourly Wages
Panel Study of Income Dynamics−Male Heads, 1976−1998
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36Table 2. Incidence of Performance Pay Jobs by Industry and Occupation, 1976-1998
Industry categories Occupation categories (1 digit)
(1 digit) Professionals Managers Sales Clerical Operatives Services Total
Min.& Durables 0.47* 0.64 0.73 0.42 0.27 0.24 0.26 0.18 0.35
0.08** 0.17 0.46 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.08
Non-Durables 0.57 0.67 0.76 0.36 0.29 0.42 0.25 0.08 0.44
0.13 0.22 0.45 0.10 0.01 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.13
0.31 0.56 0.78 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.11 0.37
0.06 0.14 0.35 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.08 0.06 0.10
FIRE 0.74 0.71 0.81 0.33 0.22 0.14 0.16 0.23 0.61
0.26 0.29 0.66 0.11 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.33
0.34 0.55 0.68 0.37 0.42 0.31 0.10 0.12 0.36
0.12 0.18 0.31 0.18 0.17 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.13
0.31 0.53 0.39 0.10 0.30 0.32 0.07 0.37 0.36
0.05 0.16 0.39 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.11
0.58 0.67 0.78 0.43 0.36 0.45 0.31 0.10 0.57
0.14 0.30 0.49 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.01 0.27
Retail Trade 0.32 0.57 0.67 0.29 0.44 0.30 0.26 0.31 0.46
0.10 0.26 0.57 0.08 0.21 0.10 0.09 0.16 0.25
Construction 0.66 0.46 0.64 0.23 0.26 0.17 0.21 0.00 0.29
0.26 0.17 0.52 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.10
Agriculture & Fishing 0.89 0.80 0.79 0.09 0.08 0.31 0.35 0.17 0.38
0.35 0.25 0.51 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.13 0.01 0.15
Total 0.44 0.60 0.74 0.34 0.31 0.31 0.27 0.22 0.40
0.11 0.22 0.54 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.15







7Table 3. Performance Pay Jobs and Log Average Hourly Earnings
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Specification
Variable Levels Levels Within-Worker Within-Worker Within-Job
Performance Pay Job Dummy 0.0721 0.0324 0.0250 -0.0033 -
(0.0140) (0.0153) (0.0113) (0.0118)
Performance Pay Received - 0.1077 - 0.0600 0.0493
in Past Year (0.0156) (0.0085) (0.0060)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs.: 30,424
Performance job dummy=1 if either a bonus or commission/piece rate earnings are received at any
time during the employment relationship; performance pay received in past year=1 if either a
bonus, commissions/piece rates earnings are received in past calendar year. Other covariates are
cubic functions of potential experience and tenure, the number of times a job-match is observed,
years of completed schooling, calendar year average of the unemployment rate in the county
of residence, and dummies for being married, nonwhite, and for union status and region of residence. 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the job-match level.
38Table 4. Skills Related Wage Differentials and Performance Pay Jobs
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Specification
Variable OLS-PPJ OLS-Other Jobs OLS-Pooled Fixed-Effects-Pooled
Performance Pay Job Dummy -0.4366 -0.2318
(0.0893) (0.0394)
Years Of Education 0.0926 0.0656 0.0632 0.0238
(0.0063) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0035)
Education X Performance Pay Job 0.0361 0.0177
(0.0065) (0.0029)
Potential Experience 0.0093 0.0058 0.0057 -0.0018
(0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0014)
Experience X Performance Pay Job 0.0039 0.0028
(0.0013) (0.0006)
Tenure 0.0049 0.0058 0.0066 0.0074
(0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0005)
Tenure X Performance Pay Job -0.0032 -0.0020
(0.0017) (0.0008)
Number of Observations 11299 19125 30424 30424
Other covariates are the same as those in Table 3, except for the higher order terms in experience
and tenure.
39(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Specification
OLS-PPJ FE-PPJ OLS-Other Jobs FE-Other Jobs
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Managers 0.094 0.083 -0.057 -0.014
(0.034) (0.013) (0.028) (0.013)
Sales -0.101 -0.043 -0.200 -0.060
(0.043) (0.018) (0.047) (0.020)
Clerical -0.311 -0.040 -0.322 -0.132
(0.048) (0.018) (0.026) (0.015)
Craftsmen -0.172 -0.003 -0.216 -0.052
(0.033) (0.016) (0.024) (0.014)
Operatives -0.359 -0.039 -0.328 -0.094
(0.038) (0.018) (0.026) (0.014)
-0.365 -0.082 -0.397 -0.114
(0.054) (0.025) (0.031) (0.017)
Service Workers -0.362 -0.099 -0.494 -0.176
(0.052) (0.029) (0.030) (0.018)
Standard Deviation 0.180 0.056 0.167 0.060
of Occupation Dummies
Number of Observations 11299 11299 19125 19125
Other covariates are the same as those in Table 4. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering
at the job-match level.
Table 5. Performance Pay Jobs and Interoccupation Wage Differentials
Professionnals
Laborers
40Table 6. Error Component Models by Type of Job
(Standard Error in Parentheses)
Panel A: Full Sample
Performance Pay Jobs Non Performance Pay Jobs
Parameter [1] [2] [3] [4]
Variance of  0.103 0.096 0.065 0.052
Worker Component (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Variance of Job- - 0.008 - 0.022
Match Component (0.003) (0.001)
Variance of  0.091 0.090 0.112 0.103
Residual Term (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
# Workers 1449 1449 2790 2790
# Cross-Products 74976 74976 117983 117983
Panel B: Workers Who Worked in Both Types of Jobs
Performance Pay Jobs Non Performance Pay Jobs
Parameter [1] [2] [3] [4]
Variance of  0.098 0.093 0.058 0.043
Worker Component (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Variance of Job- - 0.006 - 0.033
Match Component (0.003) (0.003)
Variance of  0.093 0.092 0.124 0.106
Residual Term (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
# Workers 1058 1058 1058 1058
# Cross-Products 41992 41992 26796 26796
Unweighted covariance structure models are fit to the cross-products of the
residuals of an OLS regression of log wages on the same set of covariates
used in previous tables.
41Table 7: Skills Related Wage Differentials and Performance Pay Jobs
in the NLSY (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
1986-88 1996-2000
Variable PP jobs Other jobs PP jobs Other jobs
Years of Education 0.0700 0.0550 0.0960 0.0750
(0.0060) (0.0030) (0.0080) (0.0040)
Potential Experience 0.0470 0.0440 0.0430 0.0280
(0.0050) (0.0020) (0.0040) (0.0020)
AFQT score (/10) 0.0420 0.0330 0.0530 0.0440
(0.0050) (0.0030) (0.0070) (0.0030)
Number of Observations 1553 4726 1053 2870
42Table 8. The Contribution of Performance Pay Jobs (PPJ) to the Variance of Log Hourly Earnings
PANEL STUDY OF INCOME DYNAMICS
WEIGHTED BY HOURS WORKED, CONTROLLING FOR NUMBER OF TIMES JOB IS OBSERVED
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
1976-1979 1990-1993
Actual Variance Variance w/o Performance Pay Actual Variance Variance w/o Performance Pay
Wage Compression/Expansion Between Groups of Workers Performance Pay Jobs Job Effect Performance Pay Jobs Job Effect
Fraction of PPJ 0.3048 Fraction of PPJ 0.4581
1. Var(XB | PPJ=1) 0.1302 0.1003 0.0299 0.1935 0.1313 0.0622
2. Var(XB | PPJ=0) 0.0995 0.0995 0.0000 0.1322 0.1322 0.0000
3. Average Between-Group Variance:
 (%PPJ*row 1 + (1-%PPJ)*row 2) 0.1089 0.0997 0.0091 0.1603 0.1318 0.0285
Wage Compression/Expansion Within Groups of Workers
4. Var(e | PPJ=1) 0.1434 0.1272 0.0162 0.1823 0.1765 0.0058
5. (Var(e | PPJ=0) 0.1266 0.1266 0.0000 0.1756 0.1756 0.0000
Total Within-Group Variance
6. Var(e): (%PPJ*row 4 + (1-%PPJ)*row 5) 0.1317 0.1268 0.0049 0.1787 0.1760 0.0027
Wage Gap Effect
￿ ￿ ￿ 7. %PPJ*(1-%PPJ)*( _hat2 - ( _hat -  )2) 0.0038 0.0000 0.0038 0.0126 0.0000 0.0126
Overall Variance of Wages
0.2444 0.2265 0.0179 0.3516 0.3078 0.0438
(row 3 + row 6 + row 7)
Change in Overall Variance (col. 4 – col. 1): 0.1072
Change in Performance Pay Job Effect (col. 6 – col. 3): 0.0259
Share of Performance Pay Job Effect: 24.17%
￿ predicted wage for performance pay job workers.  _hat2 refers to the squared value of the actual mean difference between performance pay job workers' log wages and non performance
the average value of performance pay job workers' X's.
8. Var(Xb + e): 
Notes. 1Computations for the counterfactual variances (columns 2 and 5)  done using the weighting methodology in DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux to produce the counterfactual
pay job workers' while (∆_hat – ∆)2 is the squared difference between the actual mean difference and the difference in the returns (the B's) across both types of jobs evaluated at
4




50-10 0.6757 0.6969 0.7712 0.7748
75-50 0.2853 0.2633 0.3935 0.3630
90-50 0.5509 0.5106 0.7509 0.7058
90-75 0.2656 0.2473 0.3574 0.3428
95-90 0.1966 0.1847 0.2336 0.1452
99-75 0.8894 0.7611 1.1126 0.8201
99-90 0.6238 0.5138 0.7552 0.4773
99-95 0.4272 0.3291 0.5216 0.3322
Sample sizes: 5261 for 1976-79 sample and 5665 for 1990-93 sample.
Counterfactual Counterfactual
44Table A1: Summary Results From Alternative Sample Made of Complete Job Matches
(Standard Error in Parentheses)
Performance Pay Jobs and Log Average Hourly Earnings (Table 3)
OLS Within-Worker Within-Job
Performance Pay Job Dummy 0.0280 -0.0043 -
(0.0212) (0.0152)
Performance Pay Received 0.1229 0.0682 0.0556
in Past Year (0.0206) (0.0114) (0.0084)
Number of Observations: 17540
Skills Related Wage Differentials and Performance Pay Jobs (Table 4)
OLS-PPJ OLS-Other Jobs Fixed-Effects
Pooled
Years Of Education 0.0918 0.0589 0.0324
(0.0083) (0.0049) (0.0051)
Education X Performance Pay Job - - 0.0177
(0.0040)
Number of Observations 6183 11357 17540
Error Component Models by Type of Job (Table 6, Panel B)
Variance of  0.102 0.043
Worker Component (0.005) (0.003)
Variance of Job- 0.000 0.029
Match Component (0.005) (0.004)
# Workers 682 682
# Cross-Products 19682 14233
1976-79 1990-1993
Overall Variance  0.2378 0.3752
0.2262 0.3233
Performance Pay Job Effect 0.0116 0.0519
Change in Overall Variance 0.1374
0.0403
Share of PPJ Effect in 0.2931
Overall Increase in Variance
Notes. Covariates are the same as those in the corresponding table for the main sample.
Complete job matches are defined as employment relationships in which the maximum
tenure level attained by the worker is within one integer of the number of times the 
job-match is observed in the sample.
Perf. Pay Jobs Non Perf. Pay Jobs
Contribution of Perf. Pay Jobs (PPJ) to the Variance of Wages (Table 8)
Variance w/o Perf. Pay Jobs
Change in Perf. Pay Job Effect
45